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ABSTRACT
Based on original archival research and oral history interviews, this 
article examines how the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) 
adapted to the evolving circumstances during South Africa’s transi-
tion from apartheid to democracy between 1990 and 1994. It 
argues that the successful framing and impact of the Free Nelson 
Mandela Campaign (FNMC) of the 1980s, inadvertently created a 
series of challenges for the AAM in the years after Mandela’s release 
from prison in February 1990, as many in Britain came to associate 
this moment with the end of apartheid. The pervasive sense that 
apartheid was over, coupled with the complexity, uncertainty and 
violence of South Africa’s political transition, created a difficult 
campaigning environment for the AAM, who found it hard to 
maintain the momentum generated through the FNMC. Despite 
encountering numerous (trans)national and local challenges which 
inhibited its impact after 1990, this article concludes that the AAM’s 
persistent campaigning presence allowed it to capitalise following 
renewed British interest in South Africa following the announce-
ment in June 1993 of a date for the first non-racial democratic 
election. This enabled the AAM to make a tangible contribution, 
primarily through fundraising, to the African National Congress’ 




struggle; social movement; 
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The British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) is often regarded as one of the most 
influential transnational social movements of the twentieth century. As Hilary Sapire 
notes, the AAM was ‘the largest and most sustained international solidarity movement 
ever mounted in the United Kingdom’.1 Even within an international context, the AAM is 
considered one of the most important components in the transnational solidarity network 
of anti-apartheid organisations which emerged during the second half of the twentieth 
century.2 The enduring images and memories that symbolise the impact of the AAM are 
rooted within an array of innovative campaigns against multinationals such as Barclays 
Bank and Shell, the cultural and sporting isolation of the white-minority regime, and the 
widespread consumer boycott of South African goods which was supported by almost a 
third of the British population by the mid-1980s.3 Moreover, the Free Nelson Mandela 
Campaign (FNMC) was critical in entrenching the anti-apartheid cause into the 
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mainstream of British public consciousness and in popular culture. This was epitomised by 
the Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute Concert at Wembley Stadium on 11 June 1988 
which was attended by around 100,000 people and attracted a global audience of over 
600 million.4 The contemporary perceptions of the AAM are indelibly shaped by the 
context of this era and accentuated by subsequent developments in South Africa, includ-
ing the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of Mandela in 
February 1990, and the first democratic elections in April 1994.
The AAM had worked tirelessly over three decades to support South Africa’s liberation 
movements, while keeping the issue of apartheid in the public eye, and simultaneously 
challenging deep-seated vested interests situated within Cold War politics and western 
economic concerns, as well as general attitudes towards race. However, the release of 
Mandela in February 1990, and the onset of formal negotiations which began South 
Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy between 1990 and 1994, created a set of 
interlocking crises that profoundly affected the AAM. Less than seven months after 
Mandela’s release, a report to the AAM’s Annual General Meeting stated that the move-
ment ‘faces the most challenging period in its history’.5 The core question addressed in 
this article is how the AAM responded to the increasingly complex and fast-moving 
political environment after 1990. It argues that the broad-based FNMC of the 1980s, 
and its unprecedented success in mainstreaming the anti-apartheid message, inadver-
tently created numerous challenges for the AAM. This was because the wider British 
public associated the unbanning of the ANC and Mandela’s release with the end of 
apartheid. The widespread sense that the job was done, combined with the uncertainty 
and violence that plagued South Africa’s transition, made the AAM’s clear single-issue 
campaigns of the past far more difficult. It also left activists unsure about how they could 
shape future events. The article examines the various global, national, and local develop-
ments which affected the AAM’s capacity to campaign effectively between 1990 and 
1994, and the multifaceted impact they had on the movement. It demonstrates that while 
the AAM struggled to replicate the momentum of the late-1980s following Mandela’s 
release, its perseverance, in spite of the many challenges it faced, enabled the movement 
to capitalise on renewed public interest in South Africa following the announcement of an 
election date, and play an active and prominent role in the build-up to the ANC’s victory in 
1994.
The article begins by outlining the central aspects of the FNMC during the 1980s and 
explores its impact on the AAM as an organisation and the wider British public. This is 
followed by a discussion of the ramifications of Mandela’s release for the AAM and how 
this moment was interpreted by those within the movement as the beginning of a new 
phase in the struggle, whereas many outside associated it with the end of apartheid. The 
article then considers in-depth the period from Nelson Mandela’s release in February 1990 
through to the announcement of an election date in June 1993. It highlights the numer-
ous challenges the AAM faced as it sought to maintain the momentum of the 1980s, 
through a series of domestically focussed campaigns designed in response to the com-
plex and evolving political context within South Africa. This section also explores the 
uneasy balance the AAM sought to strike between the need to stress to the British public 
that apartheid was not over and that the international solidarity movement’s role 
remained important, while not appearing blind to the changes that were occurring, and 
the requirement to rethink the organisation’s role in anticipation of a post-apartheid 
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future. The article concludes by examining how the announcement of an election date in 
the summer of 1993 gave the AAM renewed momentum and clarity of purpose as it 
proceeded to play a prominent role in Britain’s contribution to the ANC’s successful 
election campaign.
Winding down or final push?
The burgeoning historiography on the AAM has grappled with the theoretical dilemmas 
of how to situate the movement and its activities, as well as its heterogeneity.6 There is a 
body of work that posits the AAM as part of the globalisation of politics after the Second 
World War, exploring how certain individuals connected disparate groups together, the 
international networks that emerged, and the underlying importance of transnational 
solidarity. Håkan Thörn examined the AAM’s role in the emergence of a global civil 
society, arguing that it played a crucial part in creating a ‘transnational political culture 
that was a part of a wider, complex and multi-layered process of political globalisation 
during the postwar era’.7 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink identified the AAM as 
being part of a ‘transnational advocacy network’ which through the use, control, and 
deployment of information aimed to ‘persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much 
more powerful organizations and governments . . . [but also] transform the terms and 
nature of the debate’.8 The AAM was extremely adept at developing and sustaining itself 
across borders, tying activists together around the powerful notion of solidarity. 
Throughout the AAM’s history, its international advocacy and public campaigning activity 
in Britain was premised on, and influenced by, its networks with anti-apartheid activists, 
and developments within South Africa. As a consequence, the unbanning of the ANC, the 
complexity of South Africa’s negotiations, and President F.W. de Klerk’s efforts to reinte-
grate the white-minority state within the international community amid the rapidly 
changing post-Cold War environment, all contributed to the AAM’s emergent problems 
in the 1990s, over which it had very little control.
The AAM was also firmly entrenched in a local and national British setting, affected by 
the policies of the Conservative government, the fluctuating media attention given to 
South Africa, the unstable interest from the general public, and the commitment and 
motivations of its supporters and activists. As Simon Stevens points out, the global 
element does not tell us why individuals were drawn into the anti-apartheid struggle 
nor fully answers the question of why they focussed on South Africa. Stevens concluded 
that, ‘Anti-apartheid activism in Britain . . . must be understood as simultaneously both a 
transnational and a national phenomenon’.9 Christopher Fevre’s work exploring Scottish 
anti-apartheid activism similarly argued that the development of the movement in 
Scotland was shaped by a particular national political and cultural context.10 Building 
upon the existing scholarship, this article pays close attention to the local, national, and 
global dynamics which influenced the AAM’s development during the early-1990s.
Historical writing on the AAM has explored the multifaceted components of the 
movement’s activities, including its origins and humanitarian traditions, individual cam-
paigns, regional activism, organisational structures, race, and the broader challenges the 
movement faced.11 However, little attention has been paid to the final stages of the 
AAM’s existence during the period that maps onto South Africa’s transition from apart-
heid to democracy. Roger Fieldhouse’s detailed empirical study of the AAM’s long history 
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does contain a chapter pertaining to the years 1990 to 1994. That said, his characterisation 
of this episode in the AAM’s history as one of ‘Winding Down’ lacks nuance given that for 
much of this period, as will be argued throughout this article, the organisation attempted 
to maintain and increase its activity. Fieldhouse’s chapter begins by discussing the AAM 
leadership’s search for a new strategy following Mandela’s release, but it is primarily 
focussed upon the movement’s external relationships with the British Government, the 
ANC, as well as international institutions such as the European Community (EC), 
Commonwealth and the United Nations.12 Christabel Gurney’s essay, ‘In the Heart of 
the Beast’, also includes a brief discussion of what she more accurately entitled ‘The 
Final Push’ between 1990 and 1994. Within this, Gurney addresses some of the challenges 
of the transition period and outlines a number of the campaigns formed in response, 
describing these years as, ‘among the most difficult in the AAM’s 35-year history’.13 While 
Gurney’s work has been important in establishing a narrative framework for understand-
ing the AAM and its activities in this era, it represents a relatively succinct analysis of the 
period. This is largely due to the nature of Gurney’s project in which she embarked upon 
the challenging task of distilling the AAM’s entire history into a single book chapter.
This article builds upon the insights provided by Fieldhouse and Gurney, by adopting 
an analytical lens that not only focuses on the activities of the central, inner workings of 
the AAM, but also incorporates the perspectives of activists from every-level of the 
movement. To establish a more holistic sense of the AAM during this period, the article 
draws from anti-apartheid documentation such as political reports, minutes, the AAM’s 
newspaper Anti-Apartheid News, as well as oral testimony in order to uncover the nuances, 
contradictions and challenges of the early-1990s. As a starting point, the fifty-six inter-
views with former anti-apartheid activists, which are available through the British AAM’s 
online archive, Forward to Freedom, were analysed.14 A further twenty interviews were 
conducted via Zoom with former activists encompassing a wide array of experiences, 
roles and geographic locales, from those in decision-making positions within the AAM’s 
Executive and National Committee’s to members of regional and local structures, as well 
as professional groups, including Lawyers Against Apartheid. Most of the interviewees 
were British-born, however a small number were exiled South Africans who had embarked 
upon anti-apartheid activism in Britain. Activists’ recollections concerning the multifa-
ceted role played by the AAM were largely positive, especially around the FNMC, but 
when considering the specificities of the transition period, there was broad acknowl-
edgement that this was an enormously challenging time. These interviews provide an 
original insight into the mechanisms of the AAM, how the challenges of the 1990s were 
experienced on the ground, and the ways in which the movement attempted to adapt.
The British campaign to free Nelson Mandela
By the late-1980s the AAM had reached its zenith. The AAM’s steady growth from the 
1970s reflected the resurgence of internal resistance to apartheid after the Soweto 
Uprising (1976), and extensive news coverage of state repression during the mid-1980s 
State of Emergency which enhanced the British public’s awareness of the situation in 
South Africa.15 Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s independence and the onset of majority rule in 
April 1980, meant that the AAM was able to channel its energies into fighting apartheid in 
South Africa and Namibia. Amidst this backdrop, the AAM launched a plethora of 
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campaigns centred around economic and military sanctions, the consumer boycott of 
South African goods and disinvestment by multinational corporations such as Barclays 
Bank and Shell, as well as the ongoing cultural, academic and sports boycotts. The 
deployment of these dynamic campaigns, and the multifaceted experiences amassed 
through them by activists, both at a national and local level, were vital precursors to the 
growth of the AAM’s authority, and support base. Former AAM activist Maise Carter 
remarked, that the accomplishments in the late-1980s, ‘didn’t just magic itself out of 
nowhere, it all came as a result of what ordinary people like me were doing’.16 Without the 
sustained and often unrewarded efforts of AAM activists, its most high-profile and 
ambitious initiative of the 1980s, the FNMC, would not have been as effective.
The worldwide campaign to focus on Mandela was a carefully considered move that 
stemmed from ANC President Oliver Tambo and the ANC-in-exile during the 1970s. This 
new strategy was designed to draw attention to the anti-apartheid cause by personalising 
the struggle for freedom using Mandela as its central figure. The focus on Mandela was 
further motivated by the ANC-in-exile’s concerns that alternative anti-apartheid groups in 
South Africa such as Black Consciousness, and its martyred leader Steve Biko, would divert 
international attention away from the movement.17 Mandela reflected in his auto-bio-
graphy that the decision was not entirely popular among other prisoners on Robben 
Island because it was regarded as ‘a betrayal of the collectivity of the organisation’.18 
Despite these concerns, Deborah Posel asserted that ANC leaders recognised ‘that elevat-
ing Mandela as the iconic metonym of the anti-apartheid struggle, legitimately standing 
in for the ANC as a whole’, could enhance his leadership credentials.19 Personalising the 
struggle for global audiences also contributed to a greater awareness of the injustices of 
apartheid, while broadening the appeal and political demands of the ANC.20 In South 
Africa, the campaign for his release was effectively initiated in 1980 by Percy Qoboza, 
editor of the Sunday Post (Johannesburg), who launched a Free Mandela Campaign, which 
gained considerable public backing.21
It should be acknowledged that international audiences had been aware of Mandela 
since the mid-1960s due to his stand at the Rivonia Trial. The trial attracted considerable 
public attention in Britain, through media coverage, vigils, and demonstrations that 
placed apartheid under the spotlight.22 However, the imprisonment of the Rivonia 
Trialists, coupled with the subsequent difficulties faced by the liberation movements, 
led to a decline in public interest. The British campaign to secure Mandela’s release was 
reignited in 1978 when at a joint meeting between the AAM, ANC, and SATIS (Southern 
Africa: The Imprisoned Society), the liberation movement approved a proposal to cele-
brate Mandela’s 60th birthday.23 Although this article is focussed on the AAM, it must be 
stressed that the organisation was working within the context of a much larger move-
ment aiming to secure Mandela’s release from prison and the demise of apartheid. This 
encompassed a variety of groups such as SATIS, the International Defence and Aid Fund 
(IDAF), progressive local authorities, sections of the media, as well as churches and trade 
unions. A central feature of the FNMC as it emerged in Britain was the renaming of 
buildings and streets after Nelson Mandela and the bestowing of awards in his honour, 
often led by city councils such as Sheffield. An early breakthrough in the campaign came 
in 1981, when Glasgow’s local authority awarded Mandela the Freedom of the City. Eight 
other cities and council areas subsequently followed this example during the 1980s.24 The 
decision to honour Mandela with the freedom of nine UK cities and council areas attracted 
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significant media attention—not all of it positive—but did raise considerable awareness 
about his plight and that of black South Africans more broadly.25 By the beginning of the 
1990s, the AAM estimated that over 300 honours had been bestowed upon Mandela in 
Britain by local councils, universities, and trade unions.26 These actions to recognise 
Mandela were a key aspect of the broad anti-apartheid campaign in Britain, and were 
vital in altering public perceptions. The extent to which Mandela had become engrained 
within British culture, was evidenced by the 1980s BBC sitcom Only Fools and Horses which 
was set in a housing block named Nelson Mandela House.
A notable feature of the FNMC was its engagement with popular music. In 1984, The 
Special AKA released Free Nelson Mandela, which reached number nine in the UK singles 
chart. Building upon this momentum, Artists Against Apartheid, a group formed in 1985 
by Jerry Dammers and Dali Tambo to reinforce the cultural boycott of South Africa and to 
utilise popular culture as a weapon against apartheid, organised the ‘Freedom Festival’ on 
Clapham Common in 1986, which attracted 250,000 people.27 This free music festival was, 
however, a financial disaster for the AAM which left the organisation with a deficit of 
£40,000.28 Nevertheless, the scale and impact of this event in generating public interest in 
apartheid and Nelson Mandela provided the inspiration for the AAM’s most ambitious 
initiative of the 1980s, the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign. The aim was to build international 
pressure to secure the release of Mandela in time for his 70th birthday in 1988. A key 
aspect was the Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute concert held at Wembley Stadium 
on 11 June, which attracted an unprecedented level of interest in the AAM and the 
struggle against apartheid. Although the campaign did not secure Mandela’s release from 
prison in 1988, the AAM described it as the, ‘most effective campaign ever initiated by the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement’.29
The success of the FNMC had a tremendous impact upon the AAM as an organisation. 
Former AAM activist Christabel Gurney asserted that the campaign and concert reaffirmed 
the AAM’s position as the principle organisation leading the fight against apartheid from 
Britain.30 Crucially, the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign raised much needed funds for an 
organisation which had been in financial crisis for much of its existence. The AAM for 
example, raised £390,000 after tax directly from the concert in 1988.31 There was also a 
considerable increase in the AAM’s membership; between 1 June and 30 September 
10,500 new individual members were recruited which more than doubled the AAM’s 
membership to 18,000 by the end of 1988. According to the AAM’s ‘Report to the AGM’ in 
1989, this was, ‘overwhelmingly the result . . . of the Nelson Mandela Freedom at 70 
campaign’.32 New local groups were established across Britain to accommodate the 
growth in membership, peaking at 187 in 1988, which enabled the AAM to have a truly 
nationwide structure for the first time.33 The campaign also had a significant influence on 
young people and the AAM reported an uptake in the membership of student groups as a 
direct consequence of the Mandela campaign.34 This aligns with the recollections of 
former AAM activists who pinpointed how the Mandela campaign’s use of popular culture 
was instrumental in increasing young people’s engagement with the AAM.35
Activists repeatedly referred to the local, national and crucially, global reach of the 
Wembley concert.36 Through the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign, the AAM impinged on the 
public consciousness in a way that it had never before; as former AAM activist Margaret 
Ling recalled, the AAM became the ‘campaign of the moment’.37 The ‘Freedom at 70ʹ 
campaign enhanced the way that Nelson Mandela was perceived in Britain, and AAM 
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opinion polling in the late-1980s suggested that an estimated 92% of people knew who 
Mandela was and 70% believed he should be released from prison.38 The personalisation 
of anti-apartheid activism during the 1980s had enabled the British public to identify with 
Mandela and this undermined previously negative portrayals of him. According to the 
former leader of Camden Council, and longstanding AAM supporter Tony Dykes, after the 
concert in 1988, it increasingly became socially unacceptable to brand Mandela or the 
ANC as terrorists, at least in the public sphere.39 By the end of the 1980s, even Margaret 
Thatcher, who had been one of Mandela’s and the ANC’s most vocal critics, believed that 
his release was central to any peaceful resolution in South Africa. The FNMC had therefore 
enhanced the international legitimacy of Mandela, and the ANC, as the representatives of 
the majority of South Africans.40
Is apartheid now over? The impact of Nelson Mandela’s release on the AAM
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy was a complex, violent, and non- 
linear process that saw the instigation of formal negotiations between the National Party 
(NP) Government and opposition movements unfold against the backdrop of significant 
social disorder fomented by the apartheid state, and wide-ranging international 
pressures.41 On 2 February 1990, President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of 
the ANC and other proscribed liberation movements, and the release of political prison-
ers, triggering four years of protracted talks to end the system of apartheid. The release of 
Nelson Mandela from prison nine days later was met by jubilant celebrations by anti- 
apartheid activists across Britain and around the world.42 These celebrations were given 
added impetus by South West Africa People’s Organisation prior victory in Namibia’s first 
democratic elections in 1989, which paved the way to its formal independence from 
apartheid South Africa a few months later; this fulfilled another of the AAM’s core 
objectives.43 Numerous activities were organised in early-1990 under the auspices of 
the British Nelson Mandela Reception Committee (NMRC), including a rally outside the 
South African Embassy in London to coincide with de Klerk’s speech on 2 February. A 
second concert entitled, ‘Nelson Mandela: An International Tribute for a Free South Africa’, 
was also held at Wembley Stadium in April 1990. Reflecting on the impact of the NMRC in 
Britain, the AAM stated in its 1990 ‘Report to the AGM’ that the celebrations had, ‘provided 
a framework to give new momentum to the campaigns to free all political prisoners . . . 
and to the struggle to end apartheid’.44 This observation encapsulated the AAM’s stead-
fast belief that the celebrations surrounding Mandela’s release did not signal the end of 
apartheid, but the beginning of a new phase in the struggle.
The AAM’s conviction that the release of one high-profile prisoner did not equate to 
the end of apartheid was articulated in multiple public statements released from February 
1990. Immediately after Mandela’s release, the AAM produced a declaration signed by 
prominent politicians and public figures, as well as organisations, including trade unions 
and church groups. In addition to celebrating his freedom, the declaration affirmed that 
‘pressures must be sustained until apartheid has been ended’ and the signatories pledged 
‘to intensify efforts to isolate apartheid’. The declaration also expressed grave concern 
that the pillars of apartheid remained in place, and the movement’s recognition that these 
inhibited the realisation of a ‘united, non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic South 
Africa’.45 The AAM reiterated its official position after the second Wembley concert, 
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stating categorically, that the movement would not stop its efforts until all aspects of 
apartheid were destroyed.46 It is clear from the AAM’s public statements that they did not 
perceive the release of Mandela as the final victory, nor the fulfilment of their objectives, 
instead, the AAM emphasised the importance of continued activism to ensure the 
complete transformation of South Africa.
The political environment that confronted the AAM after February 1990 was different 
from anything it had experienced before, and it was largely unprepared for the even-
tuality. Fieldhouse observed that the AAM had been ‘caught on the hop’ by the decision 
of the apartheid regime to initiate reforms.47 The scenario mirrored the position of the 
ANC, which was left in turmoil and faced the, ‘most difficult time in the history of the 
South African liberation movement’.48 In spite of the AAM’s clear and consistent message 
that the struggle continued, Mandela’s release had a significant impact on the British 
public’s perceptions of apartheid. Testimonies from activists consistently reiterated the 
draw Mandela had, with their recollections emphasising just how vital he was to the 
AAM’s work, especially at the grassroots level.49 This is not to discount the boycotts or 
sanctions campaigns for their effectiveness, but rather, for the general public, it was 
Mandela that had drawn them into the anti-apartheid cause, and his release was why 
they had started to abandon it. The AAM had anticipated how Mandela’s freedom might 
impact their activities and were eager to ‘avoid a situation in which a substantial body of 
public opinion is deluded into believing the release of a few prisoners . . . automatically 
means an end to apartheid’, but were unable to prevent such a situation from emerging.50 
According to former Welsh-based activist Hanef Bhamjee, ‘the euphoria of the Mandela 
concerts filtered down to the general public, and effectively people were saying we don’t 
need an anti-apartheid movement anymore. It is now over’.51
‘The task ahead doesn’t . . . get easier’: the transnational challenges of 
transition (1990-1993)
The AAM’s biggest task was how to effectively counteract the prevailing narrative that 
Mandela’s release equated to the end of apartheid. Activists time and again referred to the 
difficulties of counterposing the ‘end of apartheid’ perceptions which had become 
increasingly ingrained within the public psyche. The consequences of the enormously 
successful framing of the FNMC and a ‘personality’ based-strategy meant, as Mark Guthrie, 
a founding member of Lawyers Against Apartheid, recalled, ‘it was harder, because he 
[Mandela] was out and that had been the focus of a campaign. And so it was almost like, 
what now?’52 In addition, the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation organisations 
had a tangible impact upon the role of the AAM. As the activist David Hillman recalled:
there was a clear sense that our status had changed . . . And therefore, our role was relegated 
in some way. And that we had to adjust to those shifting sands . . . Up until that moment, the 
UK Anti-Apartheid Movement was the largest broadcaster of the demands of the ANC. And 
now the ANC could make those demands in the open, legally in South Africa. How did that 
adjust what we were doing?53
This resulted in a period of adjustment in which the AAM sought to address what its new 
role would be vis-a-vis the ANC, and how it could support the transition process. An 
additional consequence of the ANC’s unbanning was that many exiles began to return to 
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South Africa; by the end of 1991, approximately 7,000 had already left Britain.54 This 
development created two core problems for the AAM. The first was that the return of 
South Africans further fuelled the public impression that apartheid was all but over, and 
the second, was that the exiled community had been an important cog in the transna-
tional networks that connected activists in Britain to developments on the ground in 
South Africa. At a stage when the AAM was reconsidering its future role, the declining 
presence of South African exiles was another challenge to overcome.
The AAM set-out a multi-pronged transnational strategy, premised on maintaining 
the pressure against the allies of apartheid, namely the British government, through 
the continuation of sanctions, while simultaneously seeking to forestall the interna-
tional ‘charm’ offensive launched by de Klerk and the NP.55 The core objectives were to 
try and level the political playing field to establish the framework for peaceful negotia-
tions, which in turn would ensure the smooth transition to a non-racial and democratic 
South Africa. There was a continued focus on international activities and the AAM 
lobbied the British government, the UN, the Commonwealth, as well as the EC to 
maintain pressure on the NP during the negotiations and to help facilitate the condi-
tions in which a ‘new’ South Africa could emerge.56 The AAM’s actions, in co-ordination 
with other anti-apartheid movements, had an effect at a European level, although the 
approach of the British government, even after John Major’s election in 1992, meant 
the movement struggled to meaningfully alter official policy on sanctions during the 
transition.57
Aside from lobbying at an international level, the AAM launched a series of domes-
tically focussed campaigns, which sought to ensure that boycotts were maintained, 
mobilisation and fundraising activities at a local and national level continued, while 
providing avenues to channel the energy of activists. The AAM’s activists were suspicious 
of de Klerk’s motivations, the support offered to the NP by the Thatcher and Major 
governments, as well as recognising the ANC’s internal weaknesses.58 Simultaneously, 
the AAM was prescient that the changing mood in Britain, and a failure to reshape its 
actions would be deeply problematic for the movement. The ‘Report to the AGM’ in 1990 
explicitly warned that, ‘there exists a real danger that outside South Africa there may be a 
demobilization of popular anti-apartheid forces’, and that this scenario must be prevented 
at all costs.59 However, from the summer of 1990, internal discussions became increas-
ingly concerned by the movement’s declining membership base and the impact this had 
on the ability to campaign. Successive National Committee meetings in 1991 identified 
that the AAM’s immediate priority was to ‘halt the decline in membership renewals’, with 
the urgent need ‘to reverse this trend’.60 But the situation did not improve, with an 
acknowledgement later in the year, that ‘some support for the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement is seeping away, and international pressure against the South African govern-
ment is undermined’.61 The ‘Political Report’ of the AAM in 1992 asserted in no uncertain 
terms that:
. . . the challenges facing the AAM are immense. We must ensure that we have the human and 
financial resources for this critical stage. This means we must continue to address how best to 
fundraise, win and maintain membership, and ensure the maximum participation in our work 
of local and regional structures, our national and local affiliates, as well as our individual 
members. We must also reach out to new sections of the population who can be won to 
support our efforts.62
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This document is a clear indication of the AAM’s intention not to ‘wind down’, but 
maintain, if not increase the organisation’s level of support and activism. Yet, the situation 
was such that midway through the transition period, the AAM’s activities were hampered 
by the reduction in activist numbers and its inability to recruit new members. David 
Kenvyn, former chair of the London Committee of the AAM (1982–1988), admitted that 
after the release of Mandela, the AAM struggled to, ‘keep people on track . . . And being 
honest, we didn’t. Membership did fall off’.63 There were genuine concerns that after 
1990, once people began to move away from the AAM, it would be difficult to, ‘totally 
influence things or get thousands of people back on the street’ if negotiations in South 
Africa did not progress as was hoped.64
The AAM’s declining membership contributed to one of its toughest financial periods 
up to the beginning of 1993. The onset of negotiations came as a shock to the AAM, which 
by the late-1980s, following the success of the FNMC, had been in a period of rapid 
expansion, including newly created roles in the central office, and more ambitious 
campaign initiatives. In 1984 for example, the AAM’s annual income had been just over 
£100,000, whereas this had increased to £775,000 by 1990.65 Despite this, the situation at 
the start of the transition had enormous consequences on the AAM’s ability to generate 
income. The AAM had never been a particularly wealthy organisation, and activists 
described it as having lived ‘hand to mouth’ or surviving on a ‘shoestring’ for much of 
its history.66 During the transition, the AAM endured an almost catastrophic financial 
position characterised by a sizeable income deficit, falling membership dues, and large 
debts totalling over £300,000 in September 1991.67 The AAM also faced a challenging 
fundraising environment caused by the pervasiveness of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative 
and the recession of the early-1990s, when unemployment peaked at 10.7% between 
December 1992 and February 1993.68 The perilous state of the British economy meant 
that eliciting donations became ever more difficult for the AAM.
Amidst a background of decreasing membership and potential financial collapse, the 
AAM continued to campaign for a non-racial and democratic South Africa. Many of its 
strategic calculations were premised on the success of the ‘Freedom at 70ʹ campaign 
which consequently influenced the movement’s ambitions. The ‘South Africa: Freedom 
Now!’ (SAFN) campaign was the first major undertaking by the AAM during the transition. 
It provided an overarching framework for activism at a local and national level, and had 
four key demands from which to hook these activities: Stop apartheid repression; Boycott 
apartheid/sanctions now; Solidarity with the ANC; and support for a united, non-racial, 
democratic South Africa.69 At the outset of SAFN in January 1990, the AAM stated that it 
was confident the campaign ‘would capture the imagination of the people of Britain, as 
the Nelson Mandela campaign did so well in 1988ʹ.70 Mike Terry, the AAM’s Executive 
Secretary, made a similar statement in October 1991; ‘the energy and enthusiasm of 
thousands of people found expression in the campaign for Mandela’s release. We now 
have to recapture the public’s imagination with the vision of a democratic South Africa’.71 
The extent to which the AAM evoked the successes of the late-1980s highlighted the 
enduring influence of this period on the movement’s thinking, and consequently, its 
strategies to emulate the momentum that had been generated, into the 1990s.
The rapidly evolving situation in South Africa necessitated an almost constant re- 
evaluation of the AAM’s activities throughout the transition, and in response, the move-
ment became adaptable and flexible in its approach. There was an acknowledgement that 
10 M. GRAHAM AND C. FEVRE
many of the tactics previously deployed were unsuited to the unfolding realities in South 
Africa. In addition to the continuation of the boycott, the international political, economic 
and military sanctions, as well as the release of all political prisoners, the AAM launched a 
plethora of campaigns following the inception of SAFN until June 1993 and the 
announcement of South Africa’s election date scheduled for 27 April 1994 (See Table 1). 
Mirroring the SAFN, some of these campaigns provided a broad framework for national 
and local anti-apartheid activities. Examples included ‘Give Democracy a Chance’ (April 
1991), ‘The Vote for Democracy’ (September 1991), and ‘Peace, Freedom and the Vote’ 
(June 1993) which broadly focussed on removing obstacles to the negotiations, support-
ing the ANC, and educating the British public.72 Other efforts had very specific purposes, 
such as the reactive ‘emergency campaigns’ that responded directly to events in South 
and Southern Africa, including the Angolan elections in 1992.
There were new initiatives launched within the broader drive to sustain economic 
sanctions such as the continued boycott of South African gold and tourism.73 Pickets were 
organised across Britain outside major high street jewellers, such as Ratners, HR Samuel, 
and Argos which, at times, attracted local publicity.74 The gold boycott was one of the 
AAM’s most notable campaigns of the transition period, symbolised by Ratners decision 
to phase out the sale of South African gold from July 1990.75 As part of the tourism 
boycott, which assumed greater priority in 1990, letters were written to travel agents and 
tour operators asking them not to sell South African holidays and when they refused to 
comply, they were picketed by local groups. The World Travel Market, held annually in 
London, was targeted in November 1990, including a sit-down protest at the South 
African Airways stall.76 Although the campaign had some impact, the AAM struggled to 
discourage tourists from travelling to South Africa. By the summer of 1990, the number of 
UK tourists to South Africa had increased by 14% within a year.77 This increase was directly 
influenced by Margaret Thatcher’s decision to lift the voluntary ban on the promotion of 
South African tourism following the announcement of Mandela’s imminent release. 
Bhamjee summed up the particular difficulties of the tourism campaign; ‘you couldn’t 
stop tourists from going, they would go anyway’.78
Table 1. Indicative list of campaign initiatives launched by the AAM between 1990 and 1994.





Stop the violence now! International 









Angola Week of 
Action 
Emergency Campaign—Tell de 
Klerk: stop the violence and 
repression
Day of Action: 
Stop the train 
massacres
Month of Action for Peace 
and Democracy
Southern Africa: 
Making Hope A 
Reality 
Boycott of South African Gold Manifesto for 
Democracy
Emergency Campaign in 
Defence of the 
Negotiating Process 
Peace, Freedom and 
the Vote
Boycott of South African 
tourism.
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The onset of South Africa’s transition away from apartheid, and the political instability 
this engendered, had profound consequences for the AAM’s campaigns, and their effec-
tiveness. One factor which complicated the AAM’s messaging was the repeal of infamous 
apartheid-era legislation. The most significant change occurred in June 1991 when the 
legal framework of apartheid was revoked, including the Population Registration Act 
(1950). President de Klerk immediately ‘pronounced apartheid dead’ and that ‘statutory 
racial discrimination had been removed honestly and completely’.79 This legislation was 
the most visible representation of racial injustice and oppression in South Africa, and the 
repeal, alongside de Klerk’s assertions, further fuelled the British public’s perception that 
the struggle was effectively over. The AAM maintained that simply removing legislation, 
although welcomed, did not constitute the end of apartheid. For one, the NP remained in 
power and the edifice of white-minority rule continued. Moreover, the AAM was con-
scious that the effects of apartheid-era legislation would be felt for decades. Writing in 
Anti-Apartheid News in July-August 1991, Frances Fletcher, a member of the AAM’s Black 
and Ethnic Minorities Committee, which was established in 1988, argued that ‘the legacy 
of apartheid will live on after the last law has been relinquished’.80 Such sentiments 
reflected the AAM’s evolving position and conceptualisation of what equated to genuine 
transformation.
Negotiating the end of apartheid was a complex and uncertain process. One leading 
commentator observed in 1990, that it, ‘will be one of the most protracted and intensive 
parlays of modern times’.81 The questions to be resolved by the main protagonists would 
define the ‘new’ South Africa, including the economic principles, constitutional models, 
federal versus a unitary state, minority rights, and the voting system. Any proposal that 
inhibited a non-racial democracy was unacceptable to the AAM who, following the ANC’s 
lead, insisted that one-person one-vote was the only acceptable outcome. The negotia-
tions were conducted through a series of mechanisms such as the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) I and II (1991–1992), and the Multi Party Negotiation 
Process (MPNP) in 1993. The final interim constitution in 1993, and the announcement of 
democratic elections scheduled for April 1994, was only reached after several breakdowns 
in the talks had necessitated compromise by all sides.82
Articulating the growing political complexities in South Africa to the British public 
compromised the AAM’s previously clear and simple message of ending apartheid. Karen 
Talbot, a former AAM Press Officer, summarised the dilemma of the AAM’s messaging; 
‘when that focus on Mandela’s release went, and then your slogans get longer, and your 
demands get more than three words, it’s more complicated’.83 Furthermore, Guthrie 
recalled that the AAM’s ability to project a ‘definitive message’ was complicated by the 
nuances of the situation and the ‘many different voices coming out of South Africa’ that 
were not solely the ANC’s.84 One example was Inkatha, a Zulu nationalist and socio- 
economically conservative movement, feted by western governments and favoured by 
Thatcher, which stood in stark contrast to the ideals and values of the ANC. Inkatha’s 
ideological outlook, disruptive approach to the negotiations, and increasing profile in 
Britain, meant there were multiple ‘voices’ vying for attention and support. Kenvyn 
observed that the repercussions for the AAM was that, ‘there were complicated messages 
that actually had to be got over. I’m not sure that we did get them over’.85 Ultimately, the 
AAM no longer had a monopoly over a clear or simple narrative around which it could 
mobilise the British public.
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The AAM’s historical role of communicating and explaining developments to the 
British public assumed added importance after 1990. Allison Barrett emphasised that 
many of the AAM’s activities subsequently focussed on incorporating an informative 
element, because a lot of the negotiations were fairly, ‘subtle, [. . . and] we had to try 
and let people understand what was happening’.86 One such example, ‘The Vote for 
Democracy’ campaign, was launched in September 1991 to persuade the British public 
‘not to relax until South Africa has a new constitutional order based on one person, one 
vote’.87 By the start of the CODESA talks in December, the campaign was explicitly linked 
to the negotiations as the AAM sought to communicate their significance to the public. 
The AAM held a series of national and local events that involved the public casting of a 
‘ballot for change’, which Mandela participated in during a visit to Britain in early 1992.88 
Anti-Apartheid News provided regular updates on the number of ‘yes’ votes cast during 
the campaign, which culminated with a week of voting between 14 and 21 March. The 
AAM reviewed this campaign positively, however it was reported in March/April 1992 that 
only 8,000 votes had been cast, which was some way off its aspirations for 100,000 
votes.89 Moreover, the AAM’s aim of physically delivering the votes to CODESA did not 
materialise due to the breakdown in the talks in June 1992, as well as unspecified 
‘organisational and technical reasons’.90
The slow pace of change in South Africa and the difficulties of communicating what 
was happening impacted on the AAM’s campaigning effectiveness. As Ling recalled, 
mobilisation and campaigning became ‘much tougher . . . than during the height of the 
campaigns in the 80s when we were on a high . . . [which] was all very exciting. It’s less 
exciting to be looking at following negotiations and dealing with the compromises that 
inevitably come up’.91 As a consequence, participation in the AAM ebbed away as the 
‘excitement’ had been replaced by a technocratic process to end apartheid, which the 
international solidarity movement had little influence over. For a minority of grassroots 
activists like Paul Phillipou it appeared as though the international solidarity movement’s 
‘job was done’, and it would primarily be for South Africans, and politicians, to solve the 
problems.92 This period also coincided with the outbreak of a number of conflicts, many 
of which precipitated international interventions, including the First Gulf War, which 
diverted media attention away from developments in South Africa.93 The release of 
Mandela, and the apparent likelihood that the country would embark upon a democratic 
transition, also encouraged some supporters, particularly trade unionists, to shift their 
attention to other causes.94 Trade unions remained critical supporters of the AAM, but the 
issue of apartheid slipped down their political agenda. This was symbolised at the TUC 
Congress in Glasgow in 1991 which, ‘for the first time in many years’, did not feature South 
Africa on its initial agenda.95 Furthermore, the AAM sought to make South Africa an issue 
during the 1992 British general election, through local and national campaigns, including 
the ‘Manifesto for Democracy’ and the creation of a ‘General Election Special Kit’.96 
Despite their best efforts, South Africa did not register as an important dimension of 
the British election, reiterating the difficulties the AAM faced in sustaining momentum in 
the face of other domestic and international concerns.97
The complexity and uncertainty surrounding the negotiations was accentuated by the 
escalation of political violence in South Africa.98 The main clashes were between the ANC 
and Inkatha (backed by the government’s ‘Third Force’), which was crudely reported as 
being ‘black-on-black violence’. According to AAM activists, this narrative fed into racist 
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stereotypes about the violent nature of black people and obscured the role of the state in 
fomenting the violence. It also emboldened supporters of apartheid to assert that the 
black majority were incapable of governing South Africa.99 So concerned by the negative 
impression created by British newspaper reporting, the AAM encouraged its members to 
make formal complaints whenever they discovered articles which failed to analyse the 
true causes of the violence.100 The AAM acknowledged that the portrayal of the violence 
had had a ‘negative impact . . . on anti-apartheid sentiments’.101 For example, the report-
ing of the violence in South Africa was held directly responsible for the limited impact of 
the ‘Call To Freedom Declaration’ launched in June 1990.102
Activists recalled a sense of dislocation and frustration that the violence in South Africa 
had not stimulated the kind of response from the British public that they had hoped. As 
Kenvyn remarked, ‘we couldn’t really get a reaction to what was going on, in terms of 
10,000 people were killed between the 11 of February 1990 and 27 of April 1994, and we 
really could not get people to understand the seriousness of the situation’.103 The AAM 
launched emergency campaigns in October 1990 and May 1992 aimed at enhancing 
public awareness of the causes of the violence, to encourage the British government to 
take decisive action against de Klerk and support international monitoring. These did not 
always have the desired impact, with one campaign event held on 5 June 1992, described 
as having ‘limited success’.104 Yet, as had occurred following the Sharpeville Massacre 
(1960) and, to a lesser extent Soweto (1976), news of mass tragedies in South Africa could 
stimulate public interest and activism in Britain.105 The Boipatong Massacre on 17 June 
1992, where 46 people were killed by Inkatha supporters and led to the ANC’s withdrawal 
from the CODESA negotiations, had a galvanising effect. The AAM remarked that it was a 
tragedy that it had taken the Boipatong Massacre to get South Africa back onto the 
international agenda.106 Following the massacre, the AAM held a series of well-attended 
protests and vigils, and its President, Trevor Huddleston, hosted an international hearing 
on violence. Such activities contributed to the mounting pressure on the British govern-
ment, and the UN, to agree to monitor the violence in South Africa via international 
observers.107
The question about whether to maintain international sanctions continued to dom-
inate British political discourse on South Africa between 1990 and 1993. From the AAM’s 
perspective, it was imperative that all sanctions remained in place to maintain maximum 
pressure on the NP during the negotiations, which was in accordance with the ANC’s 
official demands. The British Government had already begun to lift what limited sanctions 
they had imposed on South Africa as early as February 1990. Sanctions were also eased by 
the EC and USA in 1991 which put the ANC, and consequently the AAM, on the backfoot.-
108 The phased easing of sanctions was deemed a ‘reward’ to the white-minority regime 
for entering negotiations. There were also voices within the British media who advocated 
for renewed foreign investment into South Africa, exemplified by a Guardian column by 
Hugo Young, and a Financial Times editorial, which prompted a sharp rebuttal from Anti- 
Apartheid News in July/August 1990. The AAM criticised those calling for the resumption 
of foreign investment for exaggerating the extent of political change in South Africa 
which they argued was not yet fundamental nor irreversible, and reiterated that sanctions 
must remain so that the NP was incentivised sufficiently to remain at the negotiating 
table.109
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The evolving rhetoric and actions of the ANC added further confusion surrounding the 
continuation of sanctions. Although the ANC supported the continuation of economic 
sanctions during the transition, there was serious internal debate about the efficacy of this 
policy from the late-1980s. This was driven by the organisation’s need to cultivate 
relationships with overseas investors in anticipation of assuming political power. Within 
the ANC hierarchy, leaders including its President Oliver Tambo, had proposed dropping 
sanctions at the movement’s Consultative Conference in 1990. Despite being rejected by 
ANC delegates, the proposal revealed the shifting positions and debates within the 
liberation movement.110 The ANC’s sanctions dilemma impacted upon the AAM’s efforts 
to maintain the international boycott. Even before the Consultative Conference, evidence 
of grassroots confusion over the ANC’s position emerged within the AAM, when its Welsh 
Committee requested urgent clarification on the movement’s position regarding sanc-
tions in October 1990.111 The AAM had stridently promoted the ANC’s official policy on 
sanctions, although they were forced to be increasingly reactive as circumstances chan-
ged. By the time the ANC had requested that all economic sanctions cease in September 
1993, their hand had been forced by multilateral decisions, and South Africa’s financial 
crisis.112
The AAM reflected positively on the state of the sanctions and boycott campaign in 
February 1991, however, evidence soon emerged that compliance was diminishing 
rapidly. Reports only a few months later detailed that branches of South African banks 
were opening in Britain, and the involvement of British companies in the issuance of 
public bonds to the apartheid government.113 The AAM also criticised the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society’s (CWS) decision in early-1992 to restart the sale of South African 
products. Interestingly, CWS alleged that they had been told by the AAM’s national office 
that sanctions, ‘do not matter very much now’ and that they had received approval from 
the ANC.114 Though the veracity of this claim can be questioned, the CWS’ actions 
highlighted how the confusion over sanctions could be exploited by companies eager 
to resume business with South Africa. Activists also recalled how outside of the move-
ment, participation in the economic boycott waned during the transition. Barrett and Ling 
both asserted that beyond the AAM’s core activists, there was less interest in campaigning 
around sanctions.115 Similarly, Bhamjee remarked that, ‘the impetus for the boycotts 
fizzled out’.116
What created the most uncertainty for the AAM and its activists, was the ANC’s 
easing of the cultural, academic, and sporting boycotts.117 The incremental lifting of 
cultural sanctions contributed to the erosion of the AAM’s clear and consistent mes-
sage. The decisions by the ANC were clearly with one eye on the post-apartheid future 
and the need to project a new, multiracial perspective of South Africa abroad. This was 
first demonstrated in 1990 through the Sechaba cultural festival in Glasgow.118 After 
the NP repealed aspects of apartheid legislation, sporting contact with South Africa 
became increasingly acceptable if teams were non-racial. South Africa consequently 
rejoined the Olympics in 1991, and the commencement of cricket and rugby fixtures 
followed thereafter. During the following year, the ANC sanctioned a rugby tour of 
France and Britain, but when it turned out the team was all-white, the AAM publicly 
criticised the liberation movement’s decision. The ANC subsequently U-turned by 
stating this tour was no longer acceptable, yet simultaneously requested that the 
AAM did not disrupt the matches, which reportedly caused ‘considerable confusion in 
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anti-apartheid circles’.119 As sanctions eased, they inevitably impacted upon the AAM’s 
other campaigns, creating numerous ‘grey areas’ that left supporters and the general 
public unsure of the ‘rules’.120 Moreover, the communication of these changes from the 
AAM leadership was often slow in reaching regional and local groups which further 
accentuated activists’ uncertainty.121 It had become difficult for the AAM to commu-
nicate their position on boycotts to activists and the public as the terrain shifted. As the 
boycotts diminished in importance, a visible and symbolic element of the AAM’s public 
campaigning declined, further limiting the avenues around which the British public 
could be mobilised. It also reinforced the prevailing public sentiment that apartheid 
was effectively over.
The AAM’s perilous financial state during the early-1990s also threatened its ability to 
function as a viable campaigning organisation. In late-1991, Trevor Huddleston pointedly 
remarked that, ‘the AAM’s financial resources are woefully inadequate to discharge its 
political responsibilities’.122 The severity of the AAM’s debts forced a different attitude 
towards financial management within the organisation’s hierarchy, which started to 
forensically monitor income and expenditure to a greater degree than previously. 
Margaret Ling recalled that the AAM had traditionally, ‘campaign[ed] first and raise[d] 
the money afterwards because the campaign creates support, which creates finance’, but 
after Mandela’s release it could not guarantee that the money would be recuperated.123 
The AAM subsequently became more prudent with financial expenditure, while the need 
to generate income was reiterated as ‘an utmost priority for the Movement at all levels’.124 
For example, the 1992 annual ‘Freedom Run’ held at Brockwell Park, did not include live 
music, even though this had proven to generate greater publicity and engagement, 
because the previous year’s fundraiser had lost money.125 Furthermore, it was mandated 
that all campaign activities had to be underwritten in advance, curtailing ambitious 
planning.126
The AAM had an unsustainable level of expenditure, forcing it to reduce the 
number of full-time staff working in its London HQ, while they also increased the 
cost of membership and advertising rates in Anti-Apartheid News.127 Another sign of 
austerity was the decision to combine Anti-Apartheid News editions from May 1991 to 
alleviate costs and workloads, while in October 1992, the National Committee even 
considered axing the newspaper.128 The political and symbolic ramifications of cutting 
Anti-Apartheid News would have been far-reaching, and it was recognised that this 
would only feed the sense that the anti-apartheid struggle was over, which ultimately 
saved the publication. There were also discussions about selling-off ‘assets’ such as the 
AAM’s membership list to private companies, as well as the ‘Freedom Bus’, which had 
visited over 100 British towns and cities between June and October 1990 to generate 
local publicity for the AAM.129 Attempts to sell the bus were ultimately thwarted by an 
arson attack in 1992, yet these proposed measures were a further sign of the serious-
ness of the organisation’s financial predicament and the methods required to rectify 
them.130
The AAM’s hard work and focus on financial matters did reduce its debts by the 
beginning of 1993, albeit involving some painful organisational decisions. During the 
financial year July 1991—June 1992, overall debt was reduced by £100,000 and by the 
end of 1992, the AAM’s Treasurer Richard Caborn reported positively that the organisa-
tion’s finances had returned to the black for the first time in many years.131 This remained 
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the case until the dissolution of the AAM in October 1994. The internal professionalisation 
of its financial management, as well as the continued support of trade unions which 
regularly converted sizeable loans to the AAM into grants, were deemed critical to the 
movement’s improved financial picture.132
Fundraising became critical to debt reduction and occupied a significant proportion of 
the AAM’s time during the transition period. This was made harder, as previously noted, 
by the poor state of the British economy. Traditional fundraising activities such as 
sponsored events and raffles remained a mainstay for the AAM, and the pages of Anti- 
Apartheid News extolled supporters to focus on income generating activities. Supporters 
were warned that the consequences of not fulfiling targets would result in the movement 
being unable to effectively function or maintain its campaigns.133 In response, the AAM 
established a specific ‘Campaign Fund’ in which supporters were invited to donate funds 
which would be ring fenced for campaigning; by October 1991, the Fund was reportedly 
bringing in just short of £100,000 per year.134 The AAM also began telephoning its 
supporters directly to ask for one-off donations, the establishment of new standing 
orders, and increasing the value of existing ones. Despite some complaints, telephone 
fundraising proved successful and reportedly brought in £100,000 annually.135 A similarly 
successful scheme was the ‘President’s Appeal’, which built upon Trevor Huddleston’s 
respected position among the AAM’s membership, to generate tens of thousands of 
pounds in donations.136 Financial matters loomed large over the movement, extracting 
activists time and energy, and impinged upon the forms of publicity and activity the 
movement could pursue. As the prominent Scottish anti-apartheid activist Brian Filling 
recalled, ‘I sometimes think I spent more time on financial matters than I did on other 
things’.137
Another critical question which occupied the AAM in this period concerned the 
organisation’s post-apartheid future. In 1991, following earlier consultations, the AGM 
passed resolutions that indicated an appetite to assist post-apartheid Southern Africa. 
This reflected the fact that its work had not only incorporated South Africa, but also the 
frontline states of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. It also demonstrated an 
evolving understanding within the AAM that the election of an ANC government would 
not immediately reverse the manifold socio-economic legacies of apartheid in Southern 
Africa.138 The decision to start contemplating the future of the AAM was not unanimous 
though, with a debate in London on 13 July 1991 on ‘Post-Apartheid Solidarity’ revealing 
that many activists, ‘felt the debate was premature’ and distracted from the movement’s 
immediate concerns.139 Those dissenting views did not prevent further planning and 
discussion within the AAM about the future. Several iterations and proposals about the 
shape and purpose of the new organisation developed during the transition, albeit they 
remained fluid at this stage.140 Ultimately, the core ambitions involved keeping Southern 
Africa on the international agenda, assisting reconstruction and development, enabling 
equitable trade and investment, and continuing public education programmes.141 A final 
decision on the future of the AAM was not made until free and fair democratic elections 
had been held.
Amidst discussions about the future, the AAM also began to reassess its relationship to 
the wider anti-racism movement in Britain during the 1990s. Although the AAM was 
undoubtedly anti-racist, it had steadfastly focused on the single-issue of apartheid and 
was reluctant to engage with the wider struggle against racism in Britain. According to 
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Elizabeth Williams, this position, coupled with the AAM’s largely white leadership and 
singular support for the ANC over other liberation organisations such as the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC), alienated Britain’s black and Asian communities.142 Conscious that it 
could do more to engage these sections of society, the AAM established the Black and 
Ethnic Minorities Committee, which encouraged the organisation to demonstrate greater 
solidarity with anti-racist campaigns in Britain.143 Following the formation of the Anti- 
Racist Alliance (ARA), a broad-based coalition established by black Labour Party activists in 
November 1991, the AAM began to engage more explicitly with the struggle in Britain.144 
AAM representatives attended the ARA’s AGM’s and were elected to its Executive 
Committee, it publicised anti-racist campaigns through local anti-apartheid groups, and 
supported events such as a 4,000 strong demonstration in 1992 aimed at closing down 
the far-right British National Party’s office in Welling, southeast London.145 The AAM’s 
stated reason behind its greater engagement with the anti-racist struggle was the 
particular growth of racism and fascism across Europe in the early-1990s, while it had 
increasingly come to recognise the ‘connection between racism everywhere and apart-
heid in South Africa’.146 It also reflected how the AAM was actively rethinking its role 
during the transition period in anticipation of a new post-apartheid environment. 
However, the AAM’s greater engagement with anti-racism in Britain, and its deliberations 
over a post-apartheid solidarity organisation, was incongruous with its rhetoric that the 
end of apartheid was far from guaranteed. This illustrated the difficult balancing act the 
organisation attempted to strike between recognising that the situation in South Africa 
was changing, while insisting that international pressure had to be maintained to secure 
fundamental and irreversible change.
The period from 1990 to 1993 presented enormous challenges to the AAM due to a 
variety of factors stemming from home and abroad. These encompassed political vio-
lence, competing ideological voices, complex negotiations, financial difficulties, and the 
prevailing public sentiments about Mandela’s release and the end of apartheid narrative. 
The AAM contended with a difficult balancing act of maintaining a singular focus on 
securing the creation of a non-racial and democratic South Africa, whilst acknowledging 
the rapidly changing environment it was operating within, and the need to prepare for a 
new post-apartheid role. Crucially, the movement survived intact, and kept going through 
these challenges to make ‘sure it [negotiations] didn’t go backwards’, while ensuring 
apartheid did not completely disappear from the British agenda.147 Although the AAM 
embarked upon a series of campaigns in the 1990s, most did not attain the heights or 
impact of those in the previous decade. What is telling is that most activists interviewed 
struggled to recall the activities of the AAM during this period; they provided the context 
and general sense of what the AAM sought to achieve, and the forces it confronted during 
the transition, but they remained unclear of what was done to support these objectives. 
These ‘silences’ tell us a lot about the period and the broader impact of the AAM’s 
campaigns, which are a reflection of the challenges that were experienced for much of 
the transition process. As Kenvyn explained, ‘I think it was, basically, because 1990 to ‘94 
was a difficult period. And obviously, we actually all prefer thinking about the things that 
went well. And, you know the release of Mandela was good, the election was good. 
Getting there was actually a difficult process’.148
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A re-energised role: the countdown to democracy, 1993-1994
Despite encountering various challenges in its attempts to engage and mobilise the 
British population after the release of Nelson Mandela, political developments inside 
South Africa during the first half of 1993, sparked renewed momentum into the AAM’s 
work. The negotiations resumed under the auspices of the MPNP in April 1993, but were 
almost immediately derailed when Chris Hani, the charismatic leader of the South African 
Communist Party, was assassinated on 10 April by white right-wing gunmen. Rather than 
sparking further conflict, Hani’s murder brought the main parties together, and hardened 
the resolve for change. In response, the MPNP delegates in June 1993 agreed that the 
date for the first democratic election would be 27 April 1994.
The AAM openly acknowledged the difficulties it had experienced since 1990. In its 
1993 ‘Political Report’, the movement reflected that ‘in the period since the release of 
Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, it has not always been very clear what the 
role of the international solidarity movement should be, and in particular what should be 
the priorities for the Anti-Apartheid Movement’.149 Further clarity about the international 
community’s role had been provided at the ANC’s International Solidarity Conference in 
Johannesburg in February 1993, which was attended by a sizeable AAM delegation—the 
first occasion many activists had visited South Africa.150 The assassination of Hani shortly 
after the conference gave a periodic burst to the AAM’s activities; Brian Filling recalled 
that it, ‘captured the public’s imagination’.151 Anti-Apartheid News also reported in June 
1993 that the period after Hani’s murder was, ‘the most active . . . for the AAM since the 
release of Nelson Mandela’, which included a series of memorial events that stimulated 
renewed engagement.152 Despite the impact Hani’s assassination had on the AAM, the 
fluctuations in British public interest and mobilisation were highlighted at a rally a few 
months later in Trafalgar Square on 20 June 1993. Although the event was viewed 
positively by the AAM, Anna Krufthoffer reported to the National Committee that turnout 
had been much lower than expected and that ‘it was no longer possible to mobilise in the 
same way as had been done in the past’.153 This admission reiterated how difficult it had 
become to mobilise the British public, at least in terms of street demonstrations, during 
the transition period.
The subsequent ratification of an election date sparked a sustained change in public 
interest towards South Africa, which consequently re-energised the AAM. There was now 
a clear goal, something the AAM had not had since Mandela’s release. Its activities 
became centred on ensuring free and fair elections, and launching the ‘Campaign for 
Free and Fair Elections’ in July 1993, which outlined a ten-point manifesto for action. The 
manifesto stressed the importance of free political activity, impartial media coverage, as 
well as equitable funding between all political parties involved in the election, and 
programmes of voter education in South Africa.154 International monitoring of the elec-
tion was also a major priority for the AAM whose leadership continued to lobby the UN, 
Commonwealth, EC, British Government and other political parties to ensure a sufficient 
overseas observer presence in South Africa in the build-up to and during the election.155 
Reviewing the outcome of the ‘Campaign for Free and Fair Elections’, Mike Terry indicated 
that the ten-point manifesto, which was endorsed by Baroness Lynda Chalker on behalf of 
the British Government, had largely been fulfilled by the beginning of 1994.156
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A notable feature of the period following the announcement of an election date in 
June 1993 was the AAM’s outright support for the ANC. Although the ten-point manifesto 
broadly discussed the need to secure equality of participation for ‘organisations which 
were banned’, the AAM actively endorsed the ANC’s election campaign.157 This decision 
reflected the AAM’s longstanding affinity with the ANC, stretching back to its inception in 
1959, based upon a shared commitment to the ideology of non-racialism. Its campaigns, 
particularly the FNMC in the 1980s, had enhanced the ANC’s legitimacy abroad and 
helped to establish its position as the representative of the majority of South Africans. 
The AAM ‘were never neutral’ during the struggle, and backed by the ANC, marginalised 
other organisations such as Inkatha and the PAC.158 There was also a firm belief within the 
AAM that the ANC were the only party contesting the election who could realistically 
deliver the transition to a non-racial, unitary, and democratic South Africa. So, although 
the AAM undoubtedly supported the principles of securing a democratic and fair election, 
its preferred vision for the future of the ‘new’ South Africa became closely tied to the 
victory of an ANC-led government.
The AAM’s primary focus before the first democratic elections was fundraising. Almost 
as soon as the election date was announced, the ANC launched its ‘Votes for Freedom’ 
appeal which aimed to raise £1 million in Britain for the election campaign. According to 
Fieldhouse, the ANC’s decision to initiate its own fundraising campaign, with minimal 
liaison with British anti-apartheid activists, created tensions and raised questions about 
whether the liberation movement now required the AAM or whether it had taken the 
AAM’s support for granted.159 Yet, these frustrations were short-lived, and the AAM 
wholeheartedly endorsed the ‘Votes for Freedom’ appeal, even providing the ANC with 
access to its membership list for fundraising purposes.160 The AAM’s most tangible 
contribution to the appeal was channelled through its ‘twinning’ initiative, which had 
first started in 1990, but assumed greater significance from mid-1993 onwards. This 
initiative saw the twinning of AAM and ANC regions with the aim of strengthening 
relationships between the organisations, enhancing the capacity of the ANC on the 
ground in South Africa, and providing a focal point for local activism in Britain in the 
build-up to the election. It was also believed that these arrangements would cement links 
between twinned regions and sustain contact in the post-apartheid period to address the 
socio-economic legacies of white-minority rule.161 The AAM aimed for each British region 
to raise £2,000 which was reportedly enough to secure a much needed PA system and 
twelve bicycles for ANC activists in twinned regions.162 Local group activism was stimu-
lated by the drive to raise funds for the ANC election campaign and numerous fundraisers 
were held across Britain.163 Through its twinning initiative, the AAM raised somewhere 
between £20,000 and £30,000 for the ANC.164 The AAM also concentrated its fundraising 
energies on voter education initiatives, responding to ANC concerns about the lack of 
voting experience among its supporters. In December 1993, the AAM launched its 
‘Education for Democracy in South Africa’ fund which had raised over £100,000 for 
voter education programmes by spring 1994.165
Nelson Mandela’s enormous popularity within Britain was harnessed by the ANC and 
the AAM to build support for the ‘Votes for Freedom’ appeal. In October 1993, Mandela 
toured Britain including a high-profile event in Glasgow where nine local authorities 
bestowed him with ‘Freedom of the City’, and thanked the British people for their support 
of the anti-apartheid cause. Thousands attended a rally in George Square where Mandela 
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reportedly took ‘Glasgow by storm’, further highlighting the continued draw he had for 
the British public.166 The event provided another opportunity for the ANC to actively court 
international assistance for the upcoming election campaign; Filling described the cele-
brations as an inspirational and motivational moment for activists, that acted as further 
encouragement to provide the necessary resources to ensure an ANC victory.167 Beyond 
Mandela’s visit to Britain, Anti-Apartheid News published an open letter he wrote in late 
1993 encouraging the AAM’s supporters to register with the ‘Votes for Freedom’ cam-
paign so that they could be contacted by the ANC for future donations. Hinting again at 
the pervasive nature of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative, Mandela encouraged AAM 
members and supporters not to be lulled into believing that the election was a foregone 
conclusion. Mandela’s message was underlined in the title of his letter, ‘Can we count on 
you?’168
As the election neared, the AAM launched its last campaign, the ‘Countdown to 
Democracy’, on 17 January 1994, which initiated the final stage of its mobilisation and 
fundraising efforts in support of free and fair elections and an ANC victory. According to 
Barrett, Bhamjee, and Brian Hurwitz, the growing British media attention to the build-up 
to the 1994 elections created an air of excitement, which the AAM harnessed.169 Mock 
voting booths were established across the country, culminating in a ‘National Voting for 
Freedom Day’ on 20 April 1994. The AAM also stepped up its educational programme by 
producing a series of pamphlets and newsletters including an Election Briefing Series that 
explained key issues including an overview of the transitional legislation and the political 
position of Inkatha.170 This was all part of a wider publicity drive about the elections, while 
fundraising efforts were directed to either the AAM’s regional twinning initiative or the 
ANC’s election fund.171 Many activists recalled that the AAM’s main purpose in these final 
stages was fundraising. These concerted efforts to generate funds encompassed tradi-
tional raffles, jumble sales, street collections and sponsored challenges, as well as cultural 
events such as comedy nights and tours by musicians, including Dudu Pakwana, Marah 
Louw, and Hugh Masekela.172 The AAM’s final actions had a demonstrable effect, helping 
the ANC to achieve its target of raising £1 million in Britain. In addition, AAM affiliated 
unions generated £300,000 for the ANC’s election fund.173 Finally, and in order to help 
secure a free and fair ballot, some AAM activists were sent to South Africa as voter 
registration officials and election monitors, while others served as observers for overseas 
voting in Britain.174 Overall, the AAM’s activities surrounding the election represented a 
significant upturn in the activism and impact of its campaigns compared to a year earlier, 
and showcased the positive role the international solidarity movement was able to have 
during the final stages of the transition.
On 27 April 1994, the first democratic elections were held, in which the ANC gained 
62.65% of the national vote, resulting in Mandela becoming the president of the ‘new’ 
South Africa. The result led to an outpouring of joy and relief not only in South Africa, but 
internationally too. A marker of the AAM’s high-profile contribution to the struggle 
against apartheid, and the appreciation that its activists were held in by the ANC, was 
the invitation of Trevor Huddleston, Mike Terry, and Brian Filling to participate in 
Mandela’s inauguration on 10 May in Pretoria. On the same day, the AAM’s National 
Committee members were invited to the South African embassy in London to participate 
in the celebrations, which Gurney remembered, ‘felt symbolically as if we were taking over 
and it was just the most wonderful moment and you felt we really had won’.175 Following 
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the election, the National Committee initiated the process of disbanding the AAM and the 
transformation of the movement into a new solidarity organisation. The decision was 
approved at an ‘Extraordinary General Meeting’ on 25 June, with the new organisation, 
named Action for Southern Africa, launched on 29 October 1994, which continues to fight 
against the legacies of apartheid.176 After 35-years, the AAM had achieved its core 
objective of contributing to the end of apartheid rule; as the activist Simon Korner 
concluded, ‘we were one organisation that could disband because what we wanted, 
which was the right of the people of South Africa, both black and white, to elect their 
own government in a fair way, that was achieved, and the people of South Africa could 
rule themselves’.177
Conclusion
The birth of the ‘new’ South Africa was a moment of vindication for the AAM and its 
activists, who for more than three decades had been part of the transnational anti- 
apartheid struggle to isolate the white-minority regime. The history of the AAM was 
shaped by significant ebbs and flows influenced by global, national, and local develop-
ments. South Africa’s transition represented a microcosm of the AAM’s broader experi-
ence. When anti-apartheid forces inside South Africa most needed transnational support 
during the negotiations, it began to diminish, as governmental, organisational, and public 
support rapidly receded. This article has argued that the mainstreaming of anti-apartheid 
sentiment in 1980s Britain, particularly through the FNMC, inadvertently created the 
conditions for declining public interest following the ANC’s unbanning and Mandela’s 
release in February 1990. The prevailing public sentiment, due to the personalised 
framing of the latter stages of the struggle, meant that Mandela’s freedom became 
equated with the ‘end of apartheid’. The pervasiveness of the ‘end of apartheid’ narrative, 
and the interlinked problems of declining membership and a perilous financial crisis, 
combined with the complexity and violence of South Africa’s transition, created a hugely 
challenging situation at the precise moment when the AAM sought to escalate its 
mobilisation and activism for the ‘final push’. The power of the ‘single anti-apartheid 
story’ had become complicated by nuance and uncertainty within South Africa, which did 
little to stem the demobilisation of some of its supporters.
For the AAM it was not a question of ‘winding down’, but how best to preserve and 
escalate the momentum generated from decades of activism, especially when the goal of 
ending apartheid rule was tantalisingly close. With the end in sight, the role of the AAM 
became uncertain. Not only was the movement trying to convince the British public that 
the transition to a non-racial democratic South Africa was not inevitable, it was also seeking 
to resolve and prepare for its post-apartheid future. The dilemma can be seen most 
markedly in the AAM’s discussions over the creation of a post-apartheid solidarity organi-
sation and through its greater engagement with the anti-racism struggle in Britain. 
Replicating other periods of the AAM’s history, its ability to escalate its activism was in 
part shaped by political, social, and economic currents over which it had very little control. 
As this article has outlined, there were some considerable transnational obstacles that had 
a significant impact upon the capacity and ability of the AAM, at both a national and local 
level, to sustain international support for the transition process. Despite this, the AAM 
withstood these multifaceted challenges, underscoring the resilience of the movement, 
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and the perseverance of its core activists. When conditions in South Africa altered following 
the announcement in June 1993 of a clear timetable for democratic elections, the AAM 
remained in position to have a marked impact on the process of change, most notably 
through its significant fundraising activities for the ANC’s political campaigning and for 
voter education initiatives. Contemporary perceptions of the AAM have been shaped by 
the framing and impact of the FNMC, and the subsequent inauguration of President Nelson 
Mandela, which are in turn linked to wider narratives of the rainbow nation and a ‘new’ 
South Africa. These have established an overarching public view that the AAM had a linear 
path to becoming ‘the most widespread and successful non-party political organisation of 
the 20th Century’.178 This article demonstrates that popular perceptions of the AAM are 
shaped by two key moments: the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson 
Mandela in February 1990, and the onset of the ‘new’ South Africa after 1994. Such a 
leap in chronology tells only a partial story. It is important to recognise that the four years 
after Mandela’s release were filled with nuance and challenges that impacted upon the 
movement’s capacity to support an irreversible end to white-minority rule in South Africa.
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